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SEARCHING FOR A POST-SADDAM REGIONAL SECURITY 
ARCHITECTURE 
By James A Russell* 
 
There has been a great deal of discussion and controversy over U.S. policy toward Iraq and 
what that country’s future might--or should--be. Yet one important neglected issue is how an 
altered Iraq might affect regional security in the Persian Gulf and in what ways a post-
Saddam Gulf might be made more stable and secure. This article discusses past U.S. policy 
toward the area and proposes ideas for future efforts to promote regional peace and 
prosperity.   
 
With the Bush Administration intent on 
regime change in Baghdad, much attention 
in the press and in the policy community is 
understandably focused on the rights and 
wrongs or tactics of removing Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein.  But while the 
circumstances of Saddam’s removal are 
being crafted and debated, the broader 
issue facing strategic planners is the task of 
reconstructing a regional security 
architecture that may be more relevant to 
the region’s emerging requirements in a 
post-Saddam era.   
     Just as the attacks of September 11, 
2001, forced a break from the past and 
enabled new ways of thinking about how 
the United States should interact with the 
international community, the debate over 
the removal of Saddam provides the United 
States with an opportunity to reexamine a 
host of assumptions that have driven U.S. 
security strategy and policy in the region 
over the last decade.  
     When the Berlin wall came tumbling 
down in 1989 and the inauguration of the 
“post-cold-war” world was proclaimed, the 
forces of change that swept through various 
other parts of the globe did not materially 
affect the Gulf.  The presence of a defiant 
Saddam and the so-called “box” of 
containment constructed largely with 
American military power were major 
reasons why forces unleashed by the 
absence of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry did not 
manifest themselves in the Gulf.  But the 
prospect of a Gulf without Saddam could 
represent a “crumbling” of a Berlin Wall of 
sorts in the region and unleash a variety of 
pent-up forces for change that could 
profoundly affect regional security and 
stability.  The dictates of prudent planning 
suggest that the United States, the region 
and the international community start 
thinking about these issues now if we hope 
to see how a war with Iraq could be made 
into a positive force for long-term security. 
     If the Gulf has been slow to see the 
forces of change flowing in the post-Cold 
War era, it is also true that United States 
strategy in the Gulf has changed little 
during the last 20-odd years.  American 
interests, strategy, and policy have 
remained remarkably constant over the 
decades.  Starting with formulations by 
senior policymakers dating to the 1940s, 
the United States has always regarded 
unimpeded access to the oil of the region as 
a “vital” interest.  While using force to 
protect this interest was by extension 
always an implicit assumption, it wasn’t 
until President Jimmy Carter’s January 
1980 statements in the aftermath of the 
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that the 
commitment finally became public.  
Flowing from this commitment, the United 
States subsequently deployed forces to the 
Gulf in the 1980s to protect oil tanker 
traffic and then fought the Gulf War after 
Saddam threatened to overrun the Arabian 
Peninsula in 1991. 
     U.S. strategy and policy in the region 
since then have operated on three 
assumptions:  
     1. The need for access to reasonably 
priced oil; 
     2. The need to ensure that no hostile 
force control the region and its oil supplies 
or so intimidate other states so as to coerce 
supplier states into taking actions inimical 
to consuming nations; 
     3. A commitment to use force if 
necessary to protect and further these 
interests.   
     The U.S. security architecture in the 
region is largely based on these key 
premises.   
     The idea of a “security architecture” 
suggests a complex interrelationship 
between a host of political and military 
variables and a decision-making process 
that can coherently and systematically 
integrate them into a whole.  In terms of 
defining the critical elements of the 
architecture, the United States has over the 
decades: (1) defined the U.S. vital interests 
in the Gulf; (2) developed a strategy to 
protect and further those interests; (3) 
formulated policy to implement that 
strategy; and, (4) committed the political 
and financial resources to operationalize 
this policy in the region. 
     During the 1990s, the United States did 
reasonably well following this logical 
process in establishing a security 
architecture that served its interests.  In 
strictly military terms, that architecture had 
a number of main elements: forward 
deployed U.S. forces engaged in ongoing 
operations, access to host nation facilities, 
prepositioned equipment, sales of defense 
equipment to promote the self-defense 
capabilities of American allies, and 
regional military engagement through 
exercises and training.(1)  The issue facing 
the policy community today is whether this 
existing security structure will be relevant 
to the post-Saddam period and whether it 
will continue to protect and promote U.S. 
interests and those of its allies. 
 
REGIONAL SECURITY DURING 
THE 1980s AND 1990s 
     With the fall of the Shah in 1979 and 
the Islamic revolution in Iran, the United 
States found itself without a regional 
security strategy.  The “dual pillars” of Iran 
and Saudi Arabia had essentially been 
reduced to one--the House of Saud.  
     With the eruption of the Iran-Iraq war in 
1980, the United States gradually acceded 
to the idea pushed by its Gulf partners that 
a strong and viable Iraq--even a heavily 
armed one--should be a primary 
component of the region’s security 
structure.  The main purpose of a secular, 
Sunni-led Iraq, so the formulation went, 
was to provide a counter-balance to the 
more populous and potentially dangerous 
Shi’i Iran and its Islamist regime. The 
understanding during the 1980s--and it was 
a role taken by Saddam willingly and 
aggressively--was that Iraq would serve as 
the bulwark against any military expansion 
of the Islamist revolution by Iran into the 
Tigris and Euphrates valley and onto the 
Arabian Peninsula. 
     The benefit to the United States and the 
rest of the world was predictable and 
unimpeded access to oil at reasonable 
prices.  The Gulf states consequently 
provided Iraq with billions of dollars in 
support during the Iran-Iraq war, and the 
United States assisted Iraq’s war effort 
with intelligence and other economic 
assistance as part of a general policy to 
prevent an Iranian victory.  During this 
period, the United States deployed forces 
to the region on an episodic basis to 
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supplement a small naval presence in 
Bahrain. Operation Earnest Will in 1987-
1988, in which the United States escorted 
Kuwait’s oil tankers through the Gulf, 
proved to be a precursor to a larger military 
presence in the 1990s. 
     When Iraq proved to be a threat rather 
than a pillar of regional security, the United 
States adopted the policy of “dual 
containment” of the regimes in Baghdad 
and Tehran, a policy that was maintained 
throughout the 1990s.  While the United 
States sought to prevent each country from 
exercising undue influence in the region, 
there was also an implicit understanding 
that the United States and its regional 
partners did not want Iraq to collapse 
completely or be dissolved into several 
successor states for fear of creating a 
strategic imbalance that could be exploited 
by Iran.  Further, while Iranian relations 
with the Gulf States generally improved 
during the 1990s (with the exception of the 
UAE), the region remained concerned 
about Iran’s Islamist revolutionary 
government and its aggressive pursuit of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
especially nuclear weapons and long-range 
delivery systems that put their capitals at 
risk. 
     While the need to preserve access to the 
region’s oil reserves was still present in 
U.S. policy formulations during the 1990s, 
the need to promote simultaneously the 
Middle East peace process while 
containing Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Iran 
gradually came to be seen as the primary 
elements of U.S. Gulf policy.  Reflecting 
this emphasis, the U.S.-Saudi “strategic 
partnership” that had been greatly 
enhanced during the 1980s in the Reagan 
and Bush administrations grew less 
important to Washington.  
     While the Saudis provided the means 
for the United States to implement its 
policy of containment by providing access 
to Prince Sultan Air Base and other 
facilities, the U.S.-Saudi relationship did 
not necessarily flourish and grow 
correspondingly in other areas.  Little 
progress was made in the two most 
important issues in the bilateral 
relationship: U.S.-led efforts to negotiate a 
settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute and 
the Saudi request for U.S. support to joint 
the World Trade Organization. The Saudis 
were reluctant to support U.S.-led efforts in 
the Middle East peace process during the 
1990s, and the Clinton Administration 
insisted on a variety of preconditions being 
met before backing Saudi Arabia’s entry 
into the World Trade Organization.  
     The pattern of relations with Saudi 
Arabia was to be repeated elsewhere in the 
Gulf:  security and military issues 
predominated in the bilateral relationships 
throughout the region.  Reflecting this 
emphasis, senior Defense Department 
officials made routine trips to the region 
during the 1990s, while senior State 
Department involvement was largely 
confined to the Levant and Israel.  Amidst 
this backdrop, the United States--
spearheaded by the Defense Department 
and the Central Command--set about 
constructing the physical infrastructure to 
support ongoing operations that had the 
dual purpose of containing Iran and Iraq 
and, in the U.S. view at least, enforcing UN 
Security Council resolutions affecting Iraq. 
     From a military perspective, the base 
structure served two broad purposes: 1) it 
provided a political statement and signal of 
U.S. commitment to defend the region and 
conduct operations designed to “contain” 
Iraq; and 2) it dramatically reduced the 
time it would take to assemble forces in a 
contingency.  The 1990s effectively saw 
the creation of what has been regarded as 
the “permanent” military presence in the 
Gulf, in which the United States completed 
its move into the vacuum created by the 
British withdrawal from the Gulf in the 
early 1970s.  Some observers described 
this as the era of “Pax Americana” in the 
Gulf.(2)  
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     What did the security structure look like 
on the eve of the massive build-up of 2002-
2003? On any given day during the 1990s, 
there were 17,000 to 25,000 U.S. military 
personnel, 30 naval vessels, and 175 
aircraft deployed in the Persian Gulf 
region.  During the periodic crises between 
UN inspectors and Saddam, these numbers 
increased significantly, but they rarely fell 
back below these baseline levels.  Air 
Force aircraft operated out of Prince Sultan 
Air Base in Saudi Arabia and Ali al-Salem 
and al-Jaber Air Bases in Kuwait as well as 
al-Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab 
Emirates. 
     Together with carrier-based aircraft, 
these forces flew Operation Southern 
Watch missions to enforce the southern no-
fly and no-drive zones in Iraq. Established 
in August 1992, Operation Southern Watch 
followed the precedent of Operation 
Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, entailed 
coalition aircraft patrolling Iraqi airspace 
below the 32nd parallel, and later expanded 
to the 33rd parallel in 1996 in response to 
the Iraqi attack in Irbil. 
     In the aftermath of the August 1994 
Iraqi build-up in southern Iraq and pursuant 
to UN Security Council Resolution 949, 
the United States and its coalition partners 
also created a so-called “no drive zone” in 
southern Iraq to prevent Iraq, by force if 
necessary, from significantly enhancing its 
military forces in the south.   
    At sea, the Bahrain-headquartered 
Central Command naval component, called 
NAVCENT or the Fifth Fleet, provided the 
forces and command and control over 
enforcement of the UN trade embargo 
against Iraq through the Maritime 
Interception Force, or MIF.  In what came 
to be known as Operation Desert Spring, a 
continuously deployed ground element in 
Kuwait exercised with prepositioned 
military equipment stored at Camp Doha 
just north of Kuwait City. 
     During this period, the United States 
effectively developed primary operational 
“hubs” that could provide support for 
ongoing operations while at the same time 
able to receive forces that would flow 
quickly into the region in a contingency.  
Reflecting this presence and pace of 
operations, Dubai became the U.S. navy’s 
busiest port of call in the world outside the 
continental United States during the 1990s.   
     The build-up of the infrastructure 
depended, of course, on political elements 
incorporated into the architecture, namely 
the agreement and participation of the Gulf 
states, which had always depended on 
outside support for their security.  During 
the 1990s, the governing elites happily 
developed robust politico-military 
relationships with the United States as a 
way to guarantee their security. These 
states were driven by the knowledge that 
they could never rival a still heavily armed 
Saddam, and by their lingering mistrust of 
Iran--despite President Muhammad 
Khatami’s election and the resulting 
Iranian attempts at regional rapprochement.  
     To secure the necessary regional 
cooperation, the United States concluded 
agreements with every country in the Gulf 
except Saudi Arabia, agreements which 
guaranteed access to host nation military 
facilities, protected the rights of deployed 
U.S. military personnel, and permitted, in 
principle, the prepositioning of U.S. 
military equipment.  By the end of the 
1990s, the U.S. had prepositioned heavy 
brigade sets of ground equipment in 
Kuwait and Qatar, with one additional 
brigade set remaining afloat.  This presence 
was almost always augmented by a carrier 
battle group.  
     The combination of the forces in theater 
and the prepositioned military equipment 
ensured that the United States could 
constitute what amounted to a heavy 
armored division in a matter of weeks, with 
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a capacity to fly in troops to use the 
prepositioned equipment.  This ground 
component, in conjunction with air and 
naval assets already in the theater, gave the 
United States the ability to create a 
reasonably strong combat capability on 
short notice; a capability that would, at the 
very least, hold Iraq until reinforcements 
arrived. In turn, of course, this served as a 
deterrent to aggression since attackers 
would know for sure that the United States 
could respond in force to any aggression. 
     The idea of “deterring forward” was 
made into a reality in the Gulf during the 
1990s, and arguably provided the model 
that was subsequently integrated into the 
Bush Administration’s Quadrennial 
Defense Review, which specifically calls 
for the United States to develop capabilities 
in the operational theaters themselves that 
will enable an immediate response to local 
military contingencies.(3) 
     In military terms, the fruits of the efforts 
during the 1990s are being reaped today, 
most immediately in the war on terrorism, 
but in other areas as well.  In addition to 
the support provided to prosecute 
operations in Afghanistan and other 
missions in Central Asia related to the war 
on terrorism, the Gulf infrastructure will 
help accommodate whatever forces are 
necessary and provide the command and 
control backbone for any potential military 
operation against Iraq.  
     It is important to note that the host-
nation facilities made available to U.S. 
forces in the 1990s have been augmented 
by the ability to use the al-Udeid airfield in 
Qatar and plans to open a new 
prepositioning site at Arifjan in Kuwait.  
Arifjan will replace the Camp Doha 
prepositioning site, providing better storage 
facilities as well as space for the Army’s 
Central Command component 
headquarters, called ARCENT.  Al-Udeid 
with its 12,000-foot runway has apparently 
developed into a major hub for current and 
future U.S. military operations.  The site 
can reportedly accommodate hundreds of 
aircraft and up to 10,000 military 
personnel.  A Central Command forward 
headquarters element may also be taking 
up residence at al-Udeid--providing the 
forward presence in theater for the 
command that has long been sought by 
military planners.(4) 
     During the 1990s, the U.S. military 
presence and its supporting base structure 
was developed in the context of a policy of 
containing Saddam and, to a lesser extent, 
deterring Iran from regional adventurism.  
The “traditional” rationale of protecting 
access to oil supplies became increasingly 
supplanted by the “newer” principle of 
deterring aggression and maintaining 
regional stability as the U.S. focused 
politically and militarily on containing 
Saddam.  Perhaps reflecting this shift, 
discussions about the importance of Gulf 
oil receive scant attention in the Bush 
administration’s case to use force against 
Iraq. 
 
BUILDING A NEW SECURITY 
ARCHITECTURE 
     The Bush administration’s goal of 
removing Saddam provides civilian and 
military planners with the opportunity to 
re-examine a host of assumptions that have 
essentially gone unchallenged over the last 
decade.  A new government in Baghdad 
could dramatically alter the political 
landscape throughout the region that would 
also enable new ways of thinking about 
regional security.   
     In preparation for this eventuality, the 
United States and its Gulf partners should 
set about reviewing a number of critical 
issues to determine whether (and if so, 
how) the approach to regional security 
should be modified to address the new 
security environment.  Among these issues 
to be determined are:   
      1. What are U.S. interests in the Gulf?  
      2. To what extent can Iraq “balance” 
Iran?  
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      3. What will be the role and 
configuration of the U.S. military presence 
in the region?  
      4. What role will individual countries 
play in providing for region-wide security 
and for their own defense from external 
aggression?  
 
     Addressing these four issues would help 
the United States and its regional partners 
devise an enduring security architecture for 
the new century.  The United States would 
emerge from regime removal in Iraq with 
unparalleled military power in the region 
and, quite possibly, with the necessary 
political leverage to convince its Gulf 
partners to overcome their historic 
reluctance to cooperate with each other in a 
more systematic approach to regional 
security.  It is an opportunity that should be 
seized aggressively by all parties.   
   
OIL AND U.S. VITAL INTERESTS  
     The basis for the U.S. strategic interest 
in the Persian Gulf has always been oil, 
followed in the 1980s and increasingly 
thereafter by a commitment to help 
preserve regional security and deter 
aggression.  Recently, however, some 
analysts have challenged the idea that 
access to Gulf oil is of paramount interest, 
pointing to a decreasing U.S. dependence 
on Gulf oil and the emergence of potential 
alternative suppliers (Russia and the 
Caspian Sea, for example) that may make 
the Gulf less directly important to the 
United States. 
     Periodic crises with important suppliers 
notwithstanding, world oil markets today 
are characterized not by the scarcity of 
crude, but by the emergence of additional 
suppliers and new economically viable oil 
recovery techniques that should enable oil 
producers to keep pace with the expected 
increase in global demand for oil for the 
foreseeable future.(5) This is a welcome 
development for the global economy.  
     What challenges this analysis is that the 
projections also demonstrate that the Gulf 
will remain unrivaled as a supplier capable 
of delivering vast quantities of cheaply 
produced oil.  Assuming these projections 
are accurate, it is clear that the Gulf will 
become steadily more important to the 
global economy during the next 20 years. 
Specifically, the Gulf is currently estimated 
to possess 679 billion barrels in proven oil 
reserves (representing 66 percent of the 
world’s total), 22.7 million barrels per day 
in current production capacity (31 percent 
of the world’s total), and a little over five 
million barrels per day in excess 
production capacity (91 percent of the 
world’s total).(6) And these figures do not 
take into account the Gulf’s additional 
margin of relative importance if Iraq were 
to return as the world’s second leading oil 
exporter. 
     U.S. dependence on Gulf oil has 
declined over the last decade as suppliers 
in the Western Hemisphere (Venezuela, 
Mexico and Canada) have become 
relatively more important to the United 
States.  During 2001, the Gulf supplied 
approximately 30 percent of all U.S. gross 
crude oil imports, or about 2.1 million 
barrels of oil per day.  By contrast, in 2001 
the Western Hemisphere accounted for 48 
percent of all U.S. gross crude oil imports, 
or about 4.7 million barrels per day.(7)  
The anticipated emergence of new oil 
sources over the next decade and beyond is 
projected to increase U.S. reliance on 
Western Hemisphere and Atlantic basin 
suppliers in relative terms.  
     By 2020, the United States is expected 
to consume an additional 7.4 million 
barrels per day, reaching approximately 
27.5 million barrels per day (about 24 
percent of the world’s estimated daily 
consumption of approximately 112 million 
barrels per day). With the continued slow 
decline of U.S. domestic production over 
this period, the United States will become 
gradually more dependent on imported oil 
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over the next 20 years.  Net oil imports are 
projected to grow from 9 to 12.7 million 
barrels per day, constituting approximately 
65 percent of total U.S. oil demand by 
2020 as compared to an estimated 56 
percent in 2003. To quench the nation’s 
growing thirst, it is estimated that by 2020, 
the United States will double imports of 
Persian Gulf oil to 4.2 million barrels per 
day; Atlantic basin and Western 
Hemisphere sources are expected to supply 
the United States with approximately 9 
million barrels per day during the same 
period.(8) 
     But if the United States will become 
somewhat less dependent on Gulf oil 
relative to the growing dependence on 
Western Hemisphere and Atlantic Basin 
suppliers, other parts of the world will see 
their dependence on Gulf suppliers grow 
dramatically.  Developing Asia (China, 
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines) is 
expected to increase its oil consumption by 
3.7 percent a year, needing an additional 
15.8 million barrels of oil per day by 2020, 
with most of it coming from the Gulf.  
When anticipated oil demand from 
developing and industrialized (Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand) Asia is 
aggregated, the region is expected to 
consume nearly 21 million barrels of oil 
daily, with most of this coming from the 
Gulf.  China alone is expected to import 
7.2 million barrels of oil per day by 2020, 
mostly from Gulf suppliers.  To meet this 
demand, it is estimated that the Gulf will 
have to increase oil exports from 14.8 
million barrels per day in 2000 to 33.5 
million barrels per day by 2020.  In short, 
the Gulf will have to more than double oil 
exports over the next 20 years to keep pace 
with the expected increases in the demand 
for oil from Asia and North America.(9) 
     Thus, the U.S. interest in Gulf oil is 
more complicated than what in the past has 
been more narrowly defined as dependence 
on oil from the region.  While the 
industrialized world’s dependence on Gulf 
oil is expected to increase incrementally 
over the next 20 years, the non-
industrialized or developing world’s 
dependence on Gulf oil is expected to 
increase exponentially.  The implications 
of this development for regional security 
have not been addressed by either the 
United States or the wider international 
community.  
 
OIL AND POLITICAL STABILITY  
     Interconnected with the importance of 
oil to the U.S. and global economies is the 
question of political stability and whether 
the Gulf political structures now in place 
can adapt to a new political environment 
that may emerge in a post-Saddam period.  
While the immediate shape of a post-war 
government in Iraq is uncertain, it seems 
clear that the Bush administration’s long-
term objective is to establish some form of 
democracy in Iraq when Saddam is gone.  
It is unclear what impact such a 
development would have on the Gulf 
states, that until now have made only 
halting steps towards their own form of 
democracy (Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar).  
The impact of a democracy in Iraq on 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have 
made no moves towards representative 
government, is an even greater uncertainty.  
Whatever happens in a post-Saddam era, 
however, the international community must 
work with the region to try and ensure that 
any process of political transition remains 
peaceful. 
     Catastrophe awaits the world if political 
transition turns into violent revolution.  
Internal political stability is a prerequisite 
for all the Gulf States, without which it 
would be difficult for them to make the 
domestic investment and create the 
conditions to attract the foreign investment 
necessary to meet the world’s growing 
demand for oil.  These investments will 
also be critical for internal stability, as the 
Gulf states attempt to meet the twin 
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challenges of cushioning the impact of 
macroeconomic reform on their 
populations and expanding their gross 
domestic products fast enough to keep pace 
with population growth rates that are 
among the highest in the world. 
     The situation is particularly acute in 
Saudi Arabia.  While the smaller Gulf 
states (Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar) can 
conceivably continue to rely on their 
rentier economies over the short term due 
to their small populations, Saudi Arabia’s 
projected 56 percent population growth 
over the next 15 years suggests that its 
economy will require fundamental change 
to preserve the country’s stability.(10)  An 
inescapable conclusion is that a process of 
political and economic transition must 
occur in Saudi Arabia if internal stability in 
the kingdom, if not the entire region, is to 
be preserved. This is especially true since 
instability in Saudi Arabia would almost 
certainly affect the other countries on the 
Arabian Peninsula. 
     Such a formulation suggests that 
political and economic stability must also 
be regarded as a vital U.S. interest and 
hence involves the United States, and 
arguably the whole world, in the process of 
political and economic transition 
throughout the Gulf.  How the United 
States involves itself in this process, if at 
all, is a key policy issue--maybe the key 
policy challenge for developing a new 
security architecture in the post-Saddam 
environment. 
     Expected developments over the next 
two decades suggest a different 
formulation for the United States’ strategic 
interest in Gulf oil, with a number of 
interconnected assertions:  
      1. The fastest developing and growing 
parts of the global economy will be 
increasingly dependent on access to 
reasonably priced Gulf oil. 
      2. As the world’s largest economy, the 
United States has a vested (even a vital) 
interest in continued global economic 
development and growth.  
      3. The United States has an interest in 
ensuring that political conditions in the 
Gulf enable the region to make the 
necessary investments to ensure that 
production can be increased quickly 
enough to keep pace with global demand. 
      4. The United States must decide how, 
if at all, to involve itself in the process of 
political and economic transition that will 
inevitably occur in the region.   
 
ROLE FOR RECONSTITUTED IRAQ 
     A potential ouster of Saddam Hussein 
provides U.S. officials and their regional 
partners with a unique opportunity to 
review assumptions on the role of Iraq in 
the regional security environment.  Today’s 
policy reflects an assumptive construct 
built on a balance of power theory, which 
in the region has held that Iran and Iraq 
served as counterweights to each other, 
making the area more stable as a result. 
Based on this reasoning, if one of these 
states was to weaken, the other state would 
fill the vacuum and create conditions for 
regional hegemony and instability. 
Reviewing the historic circumstances that 
gave rise to this approach is a worthwhile 
exercise which can guide arguments as to 
whether this approach still makes sense in 
a post-Saddam environment. 
     To be sure, U.S. policy today continues 
the approach taken over the last 20 years. 
U.S. officials continually posit the 
requirement to preserve the territorial 
integrity of Iraq, however artificial its 
borders may have been when they were 
created by French and British civil servants 
in the Sykes-Picot Agreement.  The 
continued banding together of Iraq’s three 
incongruous components--a minority Sunni 
center, a Kurdish north and a Shi’i south--
is deemed essential to regional security.  In 
addition to the need to balance Iran, it is 
feared that a breakup of Iraq would 
encourage Turkish intervention in the 
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Kurdish areas of northern Iraq and Iranian 
intervention in the Shi’a areas of southern 
Iraq.   
     These concerns notwithstanding, an 
argument can be made that the evidence 
does not support the underlying assumption 
positing the necessity and role of a strong 
Iraq in maintaining Gulf security.  A 
critical examination of the historic 
circumstance suggests that a strong Iraq 
has been one of the main causes of regional 
instability over the last 30 years, 
particularly a highly centralized Iraq under 
military and Ba’th strongmen, most notably 
Saddam Hussein. 
     Even before Saddam came to power, 
Iraq threatened Kuwait in 1961 and was 
faced down only by a British deployment 
to the Kuwait-Iraq border.  After a 
relatively peaceful period during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, the Saddam-led Ba’th 
regime started two major regional wars, 
developed and used chemical weapons on 
its opponents and its citizens, and 
aggressively developed WMD, including 
nuclear weapons.  The death of an 
estimated 1.5 million people in the Iran-
Iraq and Kuwait wars, the proliferation and 
use of WMD, and the necessity of a 
continuously deployed forward U.S. 
presence to prevent further Iraqi aggression 
simply does not support the idea that a 
unified Iraq has been a stabilizing force in 
the region.  
     Given this historic record, it further 
remains unclear whether and how Iraq’s 
Sunni, Kurdish and Shi’a communities can 
function together in any sort of “modern” 
political context in a post-Saddam era.  Iraq 
has been controlled by an authoritarian, 
Sunni-led minority regime since its 
inception, starting with the Hashemite 
monarchy imposed by Great Britain, which 
was followed by military rule and a Sunni-
led Ba’th party apparatus that evolved into 
a totalitarian dictatorship.  The country has 
always been held together by coercion and 
force--not by an underlying congruence of 
interests among Shi’i, Sunnis and Kurds 
that translated into common consent of the 
people.   
     Quite the opposite has been the case. 
The Sunni minority regime has sometimes 
admitted a few Shi’i and Kurds into the 
power structure, but has basically kept 
overwhelming control in its own hands 
since the inception of the Iraqi state. 
Today, as has been the case throughout 
Iraq’s history, the Sunni minority fears 
being overwhelmed by the more numerous 
Shi’a and being set upon by vengeful 
Kurds. This belief on the part of at least 
some Sunnis, that they are in dire danger if 
the regime falls, is one of the last cards in 
Saddam’s hands in his effort to maintain 
support and to ensure that the army fights 
on his behalf. 
     Some have suggested a federalist 
democracy as a way to ensure a balance 
among the competing communities, 
perhaps reducing their ethnic coherence by 
making trans-communal alliances 
attractive. Federalism would give groups--
nominally regional, but also ethnic-related 
given the geographic concentration of these 
groupings--local self-rule. If the democracy 
aspect is intended to heighten the attraction 
of maintaining a unified state, the federalist 
component is intended to reduce the 
perceived cost of surrendering authority to 
a central government.  How such 
“democratic” arrangements can be 
structured to keep the more numerous Shi’a 
from exercising proportionately more 
control in a central government is unclear. 
     This system could work, but it would be 
a difficult task. Of course, the re-creation 
of some type of dictatorship (even if one 
far milder than Saddam’s regime and 
supplying relatively more benefits to its 
citizens) would always remain as an 
attractive short-cut to maintaining Iraq’s 
national cohesion. Indeed, the more 
imperiled Iraq’s apparent survival as a 
unified entity, the more some would 
advocate such a solution. One other 
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difference would be that the identity of the 
dictatorial, dominant group could come 
from more sectors than formerly had been 
the case. 
     When confronted with the breakup of 
the states in Europe at the end of the Cold 
War, the West gave in to the inevitable. No 
matter how hard U.S. officials and their 
European partners tried, they could not 
keep artificial entities together if the people 
in them could not or would not live in 
peace.  NATO, in fact, made the decision 
in Bosnia to separate the warring 
communities and to deploy military forces 
to end the violence.  Perhaps the lessons of 
the Balkans are irrelevant to the situation in 
Iraq. Still, this history and their supporting 
assumptions are worth reviewing as the 
international community contemplates the 
nature of a post-Saddam Iraq. 
     Whatever the practical difficulties of 
keeping Iraq together, the United States 
must declare its intention to preserve the 
territorial integrity of Iraq to attract what 
political support it can for regime change 
in Iraq.  Yet it should be under no illusions 
about the difficulties of unifying the three 
groups. U.S. officials should consider that 
by allowing the breakup of Iraq, the United 
States might find a viable path toward 
realizing an overriding policy objective, 
which is to prevent the re-emergence of 
another military dictator that will continue 
to develop WMD and threaten its 
neighbors, if not the entire international 
community. 
     Another overriding U.S. objective in a 
post-Saddam Iraq is internal stability, 
which would allow the country, in 
whatever form, to reconstitute itself 
economically and politically. Whether 
internal stability is ensured through 
democracy, confederation or some other 
acceptable political form, the United States 
should be less concerned with the labels of 
the political system than with results.  With 
the second largest known oil reserves in the 
world, Iraq has a resource and a market for 
it that can easily pay for economic 
recovery.  This outcome would benefit 
everyone: the Iraqis by repairing the 
damage of many years of failed 
government and sanctions, and the world 
by increasing the supply to meet 
anticipated increases in its demand for oil.  
This is particularly important as Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait alone are 
incapable of meeting the expected rise in 
demand for Persian Gulf oil. 
 
AN IRAQ-IRAN BALANCE? 
     If the idea that a strong, centralized Iraq 
is essential for regional stability is open to 
question, it also seems equally the case that 
the threat to the Arabian peninsula posed 
by Iran seems less compelling than it did 
20 years ago.  Simply put, the Islamic 
Republic no longer constitutes a force 
capable of unleashing political upheaval 
throughout the region.  Today, Iran is beset 
with internal political troubles, and the 
government seems incapable of addressing 
the country’s systemic economic problems. 
     While the conservative mullahs in 
Tehran continue to manipulate the state 
resources available to them to support 
terrorism, develop WMD, and actively 
undermine the Middle East peace process, 
it seems increasingly clear that their 
extremist views are disconnected from the 
broader Iranian polity. Reflecting this 
situation, the mullahs seem to have given 
up on the idea of building domestic 
popularity.  In addition to the continued 
popularity of the “moderate” President 
Khatami, public opinion polls in Iran seem 
to indicate a desire for more global 
integration and even dialogue with the 
United States, despite the regime’s efforts 
to deter and demonize such beliefs.(11)  It 
seems clear that the region no longer fears 
the spread of the Islamic Revolution. 
Indeed, in a complete reversal of the 
situation one and two decades ago, Iran is 
more imperiled with the specter of internal 
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upheaval than are the Gulf Arab 
monarchies. 
     The conventional military threat to the 
region posed by Iran also seems reduced 
over the last decade.(12) At this point, it is 
hard to see that Iran’s conventional military 
capabilities represent any serious threat to 
the Gulf States.  Amphibious operations 
across the Gulf to threaten Qatar, the UAE 
and Oman are simply not plausible.  And 
the presence of allied or American troops 
in Iraq would make any use of force along 
that avenue impossible to contemplate.  
     A quarter-century after the Islamic 
revolution, Tehran’s military threat to the 
region has decreased and the broader 
political and ideological challenge to the 
Gulf states initially presented by the 
revolution has ameliorated. While Iran’s 
continued development of WMD and its 
support for terrorism remain a concern, the 
regime’s interest in, and ability to realize, 
regional domination are far more limited.  
Even if the regime was intent on regional 
military dominance, the United States and 
its partners are well positioned to meet the 
challenge. All these factors suggest that a 
regional security strategy built on the idea 
that Iran represents a serious political and 
military threat should be re-evaluated. 
     Morevoer, the requirement for a 
“balance” between Iran and Iraq as a 
means to ensure regional stability is by no 
means clear. Instead of maintaining a 
balance between Iran and Iraq, the relative 
decline of the conventional military threat 
posed by Iran to the Gulf States suggest 
that the time may be ripe to make an 
attempt to integrate Iran into regional 
security arrangements to promote 
transparency and build trust. Drawing Iran 
into such arrangements will be initially 
difficult in a post-Saddam environment due 
to the large numbers of United States’ 
military forces that will be deployed in 
Iraq, not to mention the forces already 
deployed in Afghanistan. It is easy to see 
how Iranian extremists will paint an 
apocalyptic picture of the United States 
finally “surrounding” Iran.  In this 
environment, it is critical that the United 
States and its regional partners make clear 
to Tehran its intent to build a post-Saddam 
era in the Gulf on the pillars of trust, 
transparency and confidence building 
measures.    
 
ROLE AND CONFIGURATION OF 
THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE  
     The removal of Saddam will lead to an 
unparalleled American military presence in 
the region since the immediate situation in 
a post-war Iraq will likely require 
thousands of U.S. troops deployed for 
reconstruction, humanitarian operations 
and local security. But the context of this 
presence needs to be treated very carefully-
-avoiding the characterizations of the cry of 
“pax Americana” that are bound to come 
from critics.  Indeed, if care is taken in 
crafting the post-Saddam security 
environment, it is possible to foresee 
circumstances that eventually would allow 
the United States to significantly reduce its 
military presence in the region.  Such a 
development would undoubtedly be 
welcomed in the Gulf States, where the 
highly visible U.S. military presence has 
become a domestic political liability for the 
ruling elites. 
     While forces will be needed inside Iraq, 
a post-Saddam environment may change 
the requirements for large contingents of 
continuously deployed forces in the other 
Gulf States.  With Saddam gone, for 
example, there would be no need to 
continue Operations Southern and Northern 
Watch and the Maritime Interception 
Operations.  These operations have 
required large numbers of personnel and 
equipment rotated through the region on an 
ongoing basis. Ending these operations 
does not mean that the United States 
should abandon or otherwise withdraw 
from the region. Even while the Saudis 
have stated they will ask for American 
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troops to leave after a victory over Iraq, 
this does not seem to mean that the 
infrastructure built up for cooperation and 
emergency deployment would be 
dismantled.  The United States still has a 
requirement defend the region if necessary, 
and to have forward operating areas to help 
prosecute the war on terrorism.    
     Indeed, it would be a mistake for the 
United States to withdraw from the 
infrastructure developed during the 1990s, 
which could provide a foundation for a 
new regional security structure. Such a 
structure would move the United States 
away from the 1990s model of ongoing 
operations that depended upon large 
contingents of continuously deployed 
forces.  Instead, the infrastructure could 
develop into a vehicle to promote coalition 
interoperability, collective security, and 
regional military integration; in addition to 
the capabilities it provides the United 
States to help defend the region. 
     Emphasizing and then implementing 
these concepts would require 
fundamentally new ways of thinking about 
security on the part of both the United 
States and its Gulf partners.  Despite 
protestations to the contrary, the U.S. 
military prefers to operate without coalition 
partners, which is particularly true in the 
Gulf.  For their part, the Gulf states seem 
equally uninterested in developing any 
credible system of collective security 
outside the American security umbrella.  
Bridging this political and philosophical 
divide is made more difficult by technical 
issues, in which the mismatch between the 
U.S. and the region’s force structures 
cannot be overstated.  Differences in 
doctrine, training, platforms, weapons, and 
data formats make cooperation at the 
operational level extremely difficult.   
     Still, Rome was not built in a day. A 
phased, step-by-step process to build U.S.-
coalition military integration might yield 
results with sufficient long-term political 
commitment by both sides. Initially, the 
facilities’ infrastructure could facilitate the 
dissemination of region-wide early warning 
information and intelligence to promote 
confidence and transparency.  The 
infrastructure also could provide a 
command, control and communications 
backbone that could be used to coordinate 
exercises and training throughout the 
region.  Emphasizing these functions might 
mean a reduction and different 
configuration for the United States forces 
deployed in the Gulf outside Iraq.  
     Under such a scheme, headquarters 
command elements would assume more of 
an immediate role in regional security than 
forces engaged in ongoing operations. 
Using the existing bilateral agreements 
with our security partners as the basis upon 
which to proceed, the United States should 
continue to maintain Central Command 
service-specific forward headquarters 
elements in the theater.  The footprint of 
such a scheme would look like that which 
is in place today: Army staff headquarters 
in Kuwait at Arifjan/Camp Doha; Air 
Force staff headquarters at Prince Sultan 
Air Base in Saudi Arabia, with the Navy 
staff remaining in Bahrain.  A Central 
Command headquarters group could be 
based in Qatar at al-Udeid.  These staff 
elements should be integrated with a secure 
communications system and could share 
common operational picture information 
throughout the theater with coalition 
partners as appropriate. 
     The headquarters elements would have 
a variety of functions; 
     First, they would provide early warning 
of potential threats to regional security and 
have the ability to communicate this 
information in real-time throughout the 
theater. 
     Second, they would provide the advance 
administrative and logistical vanguard 
necessary to coordinate any buildup of U.S. 
forces in the region. 
     Third, using the Operation Desert 
Spring model in Kuwait to exercise 
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continuously  with prepositioned military 
equipment, these elements could be 
involved in continuous military exercises 
either using pre-positioned equipment or 
command-post exercises that continued to 
hone our ability to build up quickly if 
necessary. 
     Fourth, these elements could be 
configured in such a way as to build 
command-level integrated relationships 
with host-nation militaries. For example, it 
might be possible to foresee that the 
Combined Air Operations Center at Prince 
Sultan Air Base would serve as a nerve 
center for all Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) air forces. Or, alternatively, that all 
GCC Air Forces might be linked to each 
other through the facility at Prince Sultan 
Air Base (PSAB).  Each of the service-
specific “hubs” could replicate this 
notional model of coalition operations at 
PSAB. Thus, the U.S. headquarters 
elements would serve as hubs to facilitate 
region-wide sharing of a common 
operational picture and early warning, 
promoting confidence and transparency 
between friendly militaries. 
     Finally, these facilities could provide 
the in-theater platform upon which to build 
genuine coalition war-fighting 
interoperability, starting with coalition 
command post exercises and ending with 
actual multilateral exercises modeled on 
Operation Bright Star in Egypt--currently 
the largest multi-national exercise in the 
region that takes place every other year. 
 
ROLE OF GULF COOPERATION 
COUNCIL IN REGIONAL SECURITY  
     With the prospect of Saddam being 
gone, the time is ripe to try and change the 
way the GCC and the United Sates think 
about collective security.  The GCC--
whose members include Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE--
remains the only available mechanism for 
the United States to work through to 
provide an integrated, region-wide 
approach to collective security.  Thus far, 
the GCC has failed abysmally to develop 
into a meaningful mechanism for this 
purpose.  But an ouster of Saddam provides 
the United States and its GCC partners 
with an opportunity to breathe new life into 
the concept of collective security and 
regional military integration.  
     At the conclusion of the GCC summit 
on January 1, 2000, GCC members signed 
what press reports characterized as a “joint 
defense pact.”  The agreement, which has 
not been released publicly, reportedly calls 
for a four- to- five-fold increase in the 
existing GCC Peninsula Shield force (PSF) 
from 5,000 to 25,000 and for the GCC to 
develop a shared early warning system.  
The agreement also reportedly includes 
language stating that an attack on one 
member is an attack on all GCC states.  
The new pact represents the culmination of 
efforts since the end of the Gulf War to 
give the GCC Secretariat a more 
meaningful role in developing mechanisms 
for collective defense and regional military 
integration.  It is unclear how the new PSF 
force would be structured, and how quickly 
the force might be reconfigured, or more 
importantly, how much political 
commitment there is the Gulf States to 
following through on the agreement.(13)  
     In a post-Saddam environment, the 
United States could directly approach the 
GCC secretariat and volunteer to start 
working with the members to develop the 
Peninsula Shield force along the lines that 
have already been agreed. In addition to 
constituting an actual force to serve as an 
instrument of regional security, the United 
States and the GCC could integrate 
themselves more closely via the U.S.-built 
infrastructure and the Hizam al-Taawan 
(HAT) project, a C4I air defense system 
built by the GCC that will provide 
interfacing of radar data, operational 
support messages and secure voice 
communications to all the GCC members. 
The main purpose of HAT is to provide the 
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GCC member militaries with a common air 
picture through terminals in all the member 
defense ministries.  A fiber optic cable that 
stretches from Kuwait along the southern 
Gulf to Oman ties the system together.  
This cable could be used to as a data 
backbone to disseminate U.S. and 
coalition-provided information on shared 
early warning and battlespace visualization 
to the GCC militaries as appropriate. 
     Such an initiative would have to 
overcome significant hurdles, mostly 
stemming from the GCC members’ own 
reluctance to pursue collective security 
seriously.  But with strong U.S. leadership, 
the circumstances of a post-Saddam 
environment provide an opportunity to 




     As the world’s pre-eminent economic 
and military power, the United States has a 
vital interest in helping to create the 
internal conditions that will be necessary 
for the Gulf suppliers to increase their oil 
production to meet global demand over the 
next 20 years. Access to reasonably priced 
oil promises to be more important, not less 
important, to the health of the global 
economy.  A credible security architecture 
that protects the region from external threat 
while promoting collective security and 
regional military integration would 
certainly support this overall strategic 
objective. 
     For the Gulf states and their peoples, the 
critical objective is to move through a 
period of economic and political transition 
in the post-Saddam era while maintaining 
internal stability. It is critical that the 
region is free from external threats during 
this period. The example of Kuwait’s 
relatively effective investment and 
development program being threatened 
with destruction by a powerful neighbor 
continues to show how deadly and 
dangerous events can be if things go 
wrong. The question is how the wealth of 
the GCC states benefits their citizens or 
becomes an attraction for those who would 
expropriate their wealth. The stakes are 
extremely high for the local people, U.S. 
interests, and the world as a whole. 
     Consequently, serious planning needs to 
start now on the configuration of the 
regional security structure in the post-
Saddam period.  The promise of a post-
Saddam period in the Gulf represents an 
historic opportunity to fundamentally 
redefine the dynamics of a region that has 
proven to be among the unstable in the 
world. The challenge to the United States, 
the region, and the international 
community--whether beforehand they 
support or oppose it happening--is to 
ensure that another Gulf war and the 
removal of Saddam serves as a positive 
force to allow the Gulf to make a peaceful 
transition into the post-cold war world, 
providing an enduring framework for peace 
and security.    
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